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I. INTRODUCTION
As 2020 demonstrated for all of us, life can be challenging.
It can be even more challenging when your rights are infringed
upon. In general, we still live in a society that challenges, insults,
and oppresses the seemingly “different” of the herd. This is
especially the case for the LGBTQ community. While this societal
ill-treatment is difficult enough for adults, these forces of societal
judgment can feel insurmountable for students, who are usually
minors, and might not be completely aware of their rights in an
adult-run educational establishment. While it can be difficult to
prevent students from singling out or ostracizing one another, it is
unjust for adults or the educational system to treat LGBTQ students
differently because of their identity.
With this in mind, the purpose of this article is threefold.
First, it provides a case analysis of foundational First Amendment
education cases to build a structure for advancing LGBTQ cases in
the modern context. Second, it provides legal practitioners with an
evolutionary legal history and pinpoints key citations to use in
creating the legal underpinnings of their legal arguments and briefs.
Third, because the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on
this issue in the educational context, it provides a legal framework
for how to raise these issues and a discussion of how this framework
is applied in recent district and appellant court decisions.
In order to understand the current First Amendment
protections afforded to LGBTQ students who wish to express their
sexual orientation or gender identity in K-12 schools, we must
explore key First Amendment cases in education. The United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment, like the
application of many other amendments, is ever-evolving and builds
on previous decisions to form a current understanding of what is
considered protected speech. Specifically, there have been a number
of First Amendment cases that have applied directly to K-12
schools. We can distill specific elements of protected student speech
and contrast them to current cases that involve LGBTQ student
issues. Using those previous decisions as a predictive model, a
general theory can be synthesized about when, how, and why
LGBTQ student expression of gender identities or sexual
orientation is a form of protected speech. The aspects of this
framework are based on these ideas: (1) did the student’s actions
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constitute expressive speech and (2) did the school district intend to
suppress the speech or (3) did it cause a substantial disruption that
interfered with the educational environment? 1
II. FREE SPEECH AND SCHOOLS – FOUNDATIONAL CASES
One of the most quoted, but perhaps least understood,
phrases in educational law is: “It can hardly be argued that
either students or
teachers shed
their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 2
Educators are not lawyers and often inadvertently abrogate
students’ constitutional rights—maybe without even knowing it—
in an effort to maintain the educational environment in the name of
order. However, before getting into the analysis of how the First
Amendment specifically applies to schools, we must first look at
what freedom of speech truly means.
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making a
law that abridges the freedom of speech. 3 This has generally been
interpreted to mean the right to express opinions or facts without
restriction or censorship by the government. 4 As Alexander and
Alexander argue, “even though the First Amendment does not
actually use the word expression, the Supreme Court has treated it
as interchangeable with ‘speech’.” 5 However, the Constitution is
silent on its application to schools or students, particularly those

1

Limitations - In a true case or controversy before the courts, it is
highly unlikely that the merits of the case would only rest on First Amendment
claims. It is likely that there would be a Fourteenth Amendment Substantive
Due Process claim or even a constitutional right to privacy claim. Carey v.
Population Svcs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Restricting this paper to First
Amendment issues is not to say these other issues are not relevant to an analysis
that would involve students and sexual orientation, but rather an author’s choice
to limit the scope of the paper to a manageable slice of the issues at hand.
Further, students have a myriad of educational options at the K-12 level. This
paper also only analyzes school within the context of public education. Pierce v.
Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
2
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2
4
Freedom of Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
5
KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, AMERICAN PUBLIC
SCHOOL LAW 408 (8th ed. 2012).
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under 18 years of age or those who have not graduated from a public
K-12 school.
This requires us to formulate a definition of school. Often
educators do not see themselves as part of government, but rather
as some form of public service. 6 However, public schools are
special-purpose forms of government, much like the local
government of cities and counties, and as such, fall under a category
of government speech and are a type of public forum. 7 Therefore,
public schools are governmental property and carry out a
government function, and thus have all of the additional embedded
rights within that any public institution or public forum has
including the application of the Bill of Rights.
However, affording students their rights while in school has
not always been seen as necessary or even required. Schools have
often had a great deal of latitude in the education of students and the
care of students when in school. 8 Part of this reason is a concept
called in loco parentis, which means in place of parents. 9 This
concept stands for the principle that the school, and thus its
personnel, stand in for the parent when the student is in school.
However, they do not replace the parent and as such, the power the
school wields in place of the parent is not absolute. Specifically,
[a]lthough in loco parentis is considered a viable
concept, it does require prudence on the part of
school officials and teachers. Prudence in this
instance implies that school authorities’ actions must
be consistent with those of the average parent under
the same or similar circumstances . . . Although
children are subject to reasonable rules and
regulations promulgated by school officials, they do

6

Brian Boggs, The Dark Side of Education: State Level Policymaking
in the Age of Accountability 127-128 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Michigan State Univerisity) (on file with MSU Libraries Digital Repository,
Michigan State University).
7
JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS
AND QUESTIONS 1047 (13th ed. 2019).
8
NATHAN ESSEX, SCHOOL LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (6th ed.
2016).
9
Id. at 66.
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enjoy personal rights that must be recognized and
respected by school officials. 10
So, ultimately, while the school has considerable authority
over the student, it is not unconditional. Schools, as a form of
government, still must make room for student rights, albeit limited,
as any governmental entity would for a citizen. To fully understand
this, we turn to the landmark case Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District. 11
III. THE TYRANNY OF TINKER AND THE SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION
TEST
On December 16, 1965, a group of students in Des Moines,
Iowa planned to publicly protest the Vietnam War by wearing black
arm bands to school. 12 The students included two high school
students, John F. Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt, and one junior
high student, Mary Beth Tinker (John’s sister). 13 However, on
December 14, 1965, the school principals learned of the students’
plans and, in response, implemented a policy prohibiting this
display. 14 As stated by the courts, “[the principals] met and adopted
a policy that any student wearing an armband to school would be
asked to remove it, and if he refused, he would be suspended until
he returned without the armband. Petitioners were aware of the
regulation that the school authorities adopted.” 15 Needless to say,
all three students wore their arm bands and were suspended. 16 The
students did not return until after their public display was scheduled
to end at the beginning of the new calendar year. 17 The lower courts
ruled in favor of the school district and the parents sought a federal
injunction. 18 Specifically, they sought to “restrain school officials
10

Id. at 53.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12
Id. at 504. The students planned to wear the armbands for the
remainder of the school year and also engaged in fasting. Id.
13
Id. at 504. At the time, John was fifteen years old, Christopher was
sixteen years old, and Mary Beth was thirteen years old.
14
Id. at 504.
15
Id. at 504.
16
Id. at 504.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 505.
11
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from disciplining them, but the lower federal courts upheld the
constitutionality of the school authorities’ action on the ground that
it was reasonable in order to prevent a disturbance which might
result from the wearing of the armbands.” 19
The Supreme Court differed from the lower courts. Both
lower courts identified the issue of wearing an armband as a “type
of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.” 20 The Supreme Court expanted on this reasoning by
stating this sort of activity was “closely akin to ‘pure speech.’” 21
Pure speech, that is communicated through written or spoken words,
is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment. 22 Specifically, the Court stated, “First Amendment
rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students.” 23 The Court
further opined that “[t]he school officials banned and sought to
punish petitioners for a silent, passive expression of opinion,
unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of
petitioners.” 24 Thus, the Court isolated the symbolic act from the
issue of potential disturbance issue raised by the school. The Court
noted that out of 18,000 enrolled students, only a handful wore the
armbands, five were suspended, and the only disturbance came
from a handful of comments from other students. 25
The Court provided a general test for free speech in the
school forum by stating, “[c]ertainly where there is no finding and
no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would
‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’ the prohibition
cannot be sustained.” 26 In other words, if a particular act does not
substantially interfere with the educational environment, then it
must be allowed. School administrators and those that train them
have interpreted this to mean that students are entitled to all First
19

JESSE CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS
AND QUESTIONS 1047, 1082 (13th ed. 2019).
20

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 506.
24
Id. at 508.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 509.
21
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Amendment guarantees, but that the First Amendment “does not
include a license to exercise such rights in a manner that creates
material or substantial disruption to the educational process.” 27
This interpretation and lack of additional guidance may be the root
cause for why First Amendment cases in educational settings, like
the ones addressed in this paper, continue to come before the courts.
This often-quoted interpretation creates a kind of tyranny in
Tinker where anything that causes a disruption to the educational
process is prohibited. School officials adopt the narrower view that
Tinker provides them with sweeping powers to eliminate unwanted
forms of speech and expression. Such interpretations miss the
essence of the Court’s analysis and holding. The Court conducted
an extensive analysis of the particular facts of that case, noting the
small number of participants and the small number of students that
actually made hostile remarks to the students wearing the
armbands. 28 The Court observed that no threats or acts of violence
were associated with the symbolic act of wearing arm bands. 29
While both lower courts ruled in favor of the school authorities
because there was a reasonable fear of a disturbance, the Supreme
Court utterly rejected this notion by stating:
[I]in our system, undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause
trouble. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom,
or on the campus, that deviates from the views of
another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take
this risk . . . that is the basis of our national strength
. . . . 30
The Court’s view of what may cause a disruption to the
educational environment is not congruent to what actual school

27

NATHAN L. ESSEX, SCHOOL LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR EDUCATIONAL LEADERS 54-66 (6th ed. 2016).
28
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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administrators observe in practice. 31 It is not enough that a student
breaks with social norms or argues about something or has an
alternative expression for there to be a substantial disruption. 32 The
Court noted that students at the school wore buttons for political
campaigns and some even wore the Iron Cross—a traditional
symbol of Nazi Germany. 33 The Court concluded that:
In order for the State in the person of school officials
to justify prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, it must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint. 34
This highlights several important concepts. First, the school
official is acting in official governmental capacity where Free
Speech considerations must be observed. Second, school officials
have a duty to allow students to express themselves. Finally, just
because an idea or expression may be unpleasant, it does not
necessarily rise to the level of substantially disrupting the
educational environment. Tinker is the bedrock case upon which all
other educational freedom of speech cases are built. This case has
particular significance to the LGBTQ community because it held
that expression of sexual orientation—without heightened
additional factors—cannot be seen as a disturbance of the
educational environment.

31

Id.
Id.
33
Id. at 510.
34
Id. at 509.
32
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IV. BETHEL SCHOOL DISTRICT AND HEIGHTENED FACTORS
Bethel School District v. Fraser 35 adds an additional
dimension to the Tinker analysis. Whereas Tinker focused on
student actions that were akin to “pure speech” through silent
expression divorced from action, Bethel dealt with actual action.
On April 26, 1986, Matthew Fraser delivered a speech to his
fellow classmates at Bethel High School in Bethel, Washington. 36
This speech was part of an optional student rally where students had
the option to attend the rally and listen to speeches related to student
government or go to student hall. 37 Petitioner Fraser nominated a
fellow classmate to a student government office in front of 600
students. 38 During his speech, Fraser referred to “his candidate in
terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.” 39 He
stated such things as:
I know a man who is firm-–he’s firm in his pants,
he’s firm in his shirt, his character is firm . . . .
[He] takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary,
he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t
attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and
pushing until finally—he succeeds.
[A] man who will go to the very end-–even the
climax, for each and every one of you.
. . . [H]e’ll never come between you and the best our
high school can be. 40
This speech, at best a series of campy double entendres, was
found inappropriate by school administrators and a violation of the
school’s prohibition of the use of obscene language. 41

35

Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Id. at 677.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 678.
40
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41
Id. The language of the Bethel High School rule on obscene
language was a nod to Tinker and stated, “conduct which materially and
substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the
use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”
36

72

Fraser was suspended for three days for violating this rule,
so he brought a suit against the school, however, 42 both lower
courts found the student’s speech to be protected by his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech, and in doing so held it to
be “indistinguishable from the protest armband in Tinker . . .." 43
The Supreme Court, however, rejected these findings,
noting that “in upholding the students’ right to engage in a
nondisruptive, passive expression of a political viewpoint in Tinker,
this Court was careful to note that the case did ‘not concern speech
or action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of
other students.” 44 In so doing, the Court made a sound distinction
between expression and speech. The Court went a step further and
defined the role of public education as one that “prepare[s] pupils
for citizenship in the Republic.” 45 This must include “tolerance of
divergent political and religious views, even when the views
expressed may be unpopular. But these ‘fundamental values’ must
also take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others,
and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students.” 46
The Court articulates the following to balance the rights of an
aggrieved student with those of other students:
The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and
controversial views in schools and classrooms must
be balanced against the society’s countervailing
interest in teaching students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior. Even the most heated
political discourse in a democratic society requires
consideration for the personal sensibilities of the
other participants and audiences. 47

42

Id. at 679.
Id. The Ninth Circuit “explicitly rejected the School District’s
argument that the speech, unlike the passive conduct of wearing a black
armband, had a disruptive effect on the educational process.”
44
Id.
45
Id. at 681.
46
Id.
47
Id.
43
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Specifically, disciplining a student for using lewd or vulgar
language must be “unrelated to any political viewpoint.” 48 Here,
although Fraser conveyed a political message, the Court separated
the message from its lewd delivery. 49
The Court wrapped this case up by analyzing the role of the
school in promoting societal values and the Constitution by stating:
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from
insisting that certain modes of expression are
inappropriate and subject to sanctions. The
inculcation of these values is truly the “work of the
schools.” The determination of what manner of
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board. 50
The Court held that Fraser’s language was offensive to the
teachers and students, and that it would also be offensive to “any
mature person.” 51 The Court concluded,
The schools, as instruments of the state, may
determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature
conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates
lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such
as that indulged in by this confused boy . . . .
....
. . . These cases recognize the obvious concern on the
part of parents, and school authorities acting in loco
parentis, to protect children—especially in a captive
audience—from exposure to sexually explicit,
indecent, or lewd speech. 52
The Court’s opinion suggests that it is the school’s
responsibility to raise citizens that can function in society and
participate in the republican form of government. This includes
educating them in the values of civil discourse. But, those values
48

Id. at 685.
Id.
50
Id. at 683 (citation omitted).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 683–84.
49
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are limited to socially appropriate speech. 53 An important caveat is
that socially appropriate speech should not be lewd or vulgar,
regardless of the underlying ideas. However, the Court does not go
on to determine social appropriate, but says that it plays out in
schools on a case by case basis. Regardless, while a student may
discuss a “hot” topic, the student cannot do so by using obscenities
and sexually suggestive language.
V. MORSE AND THE PROMOTION OF ILLEGAL ACTS
Morse v. Frederick is different than Tinker and Bethel in that
the student, Joseph Frederick, sued both the school board and the
principal, Deborah Morse, arguing that Morse violated his First
Amendment rights in preventing the student from advocating for
illegal drug use. 54
On January 24, 2002, in Juneau, Alaska, the Olympic Torch
passed by the school on its way to Salt Lake City, Utah, for the 2002
Winter Olympics. 55 As part of this occasion, the principal allowed
the students to cross the street to non-school property to watch the
torch pass by. 56 Frederick, a high school senior, unrolled a fourteenfoot banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” 57 Morse asked him
to take the sign down. Frederick refused, and the principal
confiscated the sign and suspended him for ten days. 58
Morse stated that the sign encouraged illegal drug use and
violated school policy. 59 The school board policy prohibited any
assembly or public expression that advocates using illegal
substances. 60 Frederick appealed to the superintendent, who upheld
the suspension. 61 The superintendent stated that Morse disciplined
Frederick because his speech appeared to promote illegal drug use,
not because Morse disagreed with the message. 62 Further, the
superintendent argued that this kind of action in front of the student
53

Id. at 681.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 399 (2007).
55
Id. at 397.
56
See id. at 397, 400–01.
57
Id. at 397.
58
Id. at 398.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
54
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body interfered with the work of the school—a clear reference to
Tinker. 63
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question
of “whether Frederick had a First Amendment right to wield his
banner.” 64 The Court found the banner’s message ‘cryptic’ because
it had multiple unclear meanings. 65 But Morse felt that the banner
would be reasonably interpreted as promoting illegal drug use. 66
However, because of the interplay between Tinker and Bethel, there
is not a bright-line rule.
Recall that in Tinker, the Court held, “student expression
may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude
that it will ‘materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school.’ ” 67 Conversely, Bethel held, “school
boards have the authority to determine ‘what manner of speech in
the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate.’ ” 68 The single
difference in reasoning between the two cases creates a quagmire
for legal interpretation. Taken together, the students have a right to
free expression while simultaneously saying that school boards can
determine what expression is inappropriate. It is worth noting that
the Court in Bethel frames its opinion in the negative. Chief Justice
Burger, who delivered the opinion, states that school boards can
determine what is inappropriate, not what is appropriate for pure
speech purposes. 69
This tension is one that educators must grapple with during
their engagements with students, particularly when deciding
whether the expression or speech is appropriate. Tinker is about
expressive conduct while Bethel involved pure speech. While the
Court said that the actions in Tinker were akin to pure speech, 70 this
tension still requires educators to make a differentiation when
addressing these activies in the educational environment.
63

See id.
Id. at 400.
65
See id. at 401.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 403 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)).
68
Id. at 404 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683
(1986)).
69
See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683.
70
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505
(1969).
64
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Expressive conduct, at least as it appeared in Tinker, may well be
less disruptive than inappropriate pure speech in large assemblies.
In Morse, the Court found itself between these two cases and
specifically set out to address this situation. 71 The Court attempted
to synthesize the two cases, but failed to resolve all ambiguity
between the competing concepts because they only felt a need to
address limited issues related in the instant case. 72 However, the
Bethel Court articulated two basic concepts.
First, Bethel’s holding reaffirmed that “the constitutional
rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive
with the rights of adults in other settings.” 73 In other words, while
students, and presumably teachers, do not shed their rights when
they enter the school environment, these rights are not the same as
those of an adult in a non-school public venue. Schools are a limited
public forum. The Court also spoke to Fraser, stating that if Fraser
were an adult in a public, non-school forum, his speech would have
been protected. 74 However, comparing Bethel to Tinker, the
student’s “First Amendment rights were circumscribed ‘in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment.’” 75
Second, while Tinker created one form of analysis—a
substantial disruption test—this is not absolute for determining First
Amendment rights in a school setting. 76 As the Court stated,
“whatever approach [Bethel] employed, it certainly did not conduct
the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker.” 77 While
Chief Justice Burger did not say the speech in Bethel was
substantially disruptive in those terms, he did imply that it was.
However, Morse seems to open the door for other tests.
Ultimately, the Morse Court concluded that schools can
prohibit the promotion of illegal activities in schools and schoolsponsored activities. 78 However, after this analysis, the Court
veered away from applying Bethel and Thinker. Instead, the Court
discussed what has been later termed the war on drugs in the United
71

See Morse, 551 U.S. at 403–04.
See id.
73
See id. at 404–05.
74
See id. at 405.
75
Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 403.
72

77

States and the money provided to fight it – making a case for a
legitimate government interest in curbing these kinds of activities. 79
The Court then turns its analysis to the concept that Chief Justice
Burger highlighted on preparing citizens for active engagement in
the Republic. 80 As Morse concludes, Congress has said fighting
drugs is a priority, and therefore schools should also be part of
this. 81 This line of thinking related to democratic values has
implications for schools as we consider Congress and their funding
and legislative priorities, including such legislation as the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA). 82 When Congress creates laws, it also
generates societal values and norms that play out everywhere,
including school governance.
HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT AND WRITTEN STUDENT
SPEECH

VI.

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier is the last case that
adds to the analysis of First Amendment rights for LGBTQ
students. 83 This case addresses the level of control a school district
has in “exercis[ing] editorial control over the contents of a high
school newspaper produced as part of the school’s journalism
curriculum.” 84
In Hazelwood, three students, now graduated, sued the
school district claiming that school officials violated their First
Amendment rights by deleting two pages of articles from the May
13, 1983, issue of the school newspaper. 85 This newspaper was
produced as part of the school’s journalism class and distributed to
4,500 students, staff, and community members every three weeks. 86
The principal reviewed the newspaper before every publication and
took umbrage with two particular articles in this issue. 87 One of the
articles discussed teenage pregnancy, and the other discussed the
79

Id. at 407–08.
Id.
81
Id. at 408.
82
Id. at 409.
83
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
84
Id. at 262.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 263.
80
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impacts of divorce on students. 88 The principal objected to these
articles because the teenage pregnancy article may promote sexual
activity, and objected to both on the grounds that the information in
each article could identify the students. 89 Given that this was the last
run of the paper before the end of the school year, instead of reworking the articles, the principal opted to cut them instead, and his
superiors agreed with his decision. 90
Here, the Supreme Court pulls both Tinker and Bethel to
make its case for supporting the school district’s decisions. Justice
White, writing for the Court, argues that schools do not need to
tolerate speech from the students that is at odds with their
educational mission even though the government would not be able
to take similar actions outside of the school environment. 91 The
Court goes on to interpret the actions of Bethel in more detail,
stating:
[A] student could be disciplined for having delivered
a speech that was “sexually explicit” but not legally
obscene at an official school assembly, because the
school was entitled to “disassociate itself” from the
speech in a manner that would demonstrate to others
that such vulgarity is “wholly inconsistent with the
‘fundamental values’ of the public education.” 92
This, again, comes back to the idea of values in the civic
discourse of a school district, which Bethel said were set by the
school board. 93
The Court makes clear, a school, unlike a public park, is a
closed forum unless the school purposefully opens itself up to a
public function. 94 This is because,
[T]he facilities have instead been reserved for other
intended purposes, “communicative or otherwise,”
88

Id.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 263.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 266.
92
Id. at 26667.
93
Id. at 266.
94
Id. at 267.
89
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then no public forum has been created, and school
officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the
speech of students, teachers, and other members of
the school community. “The government does not
create a public forum by inaction or by permitting
limited discourse, but by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse.” 95
In other words, the school is a closed forum for those inside
it, namely students for the purposes of this paper. As a result, there
are limits on student’s First Amendment right to free speech that
would not normally be applied to adults in a non-school public
forum. 96 As long as the school has served the forum for its intended
purpose, the school can regulate such publications as a school
newspaper in a reasonable manner. 97
The Court makes one last distinction in this case that is
important for LGBTQ considerations of First Amendment rights,
and it goes back to Tinker. 98 The Court states, “[t]he question
whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular
student speech—the question we addressed in Tinker—is different
from the question where the First Amendment requires a school
affirmatively to promote a particular student speech.” 99 The first
part of that holding, dealt with the issue of whether a school can
“silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on
school premises.” 100 The Court decided that a school cannot silence
a student’s personal expression so long as it passes the substantial
disruptive test. 101 The second part of this statement deals with
speech and expression that is incarnate in school sponsored
activities where “students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.” 102 Or,
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stated another way, done with the permission of the school and
under their authority. Therefore, educators and schools,
[A]re entitled to exercise greater control over this []
form of student expression to assure that participants
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to
teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to
material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker
are not erroneously attributed to the school … [this
includes]
ungrammatical,
poorly
written,
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar
or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences
[student product].” 103
The Court distinguished between the individual expression
outlined in Tinker and expression that is delivered through the
educational environment. 104 The distinction between the two is
clear in these cases. Only a few students wore the armband in Tinker
and it was not a school-sponsored activity. The newspaper is
sponsored by the school and available to all students. But these
differences can become muddled when other types of school-related
expression are involved. In Hazelwood, the school did not violate
the First Amendment when it exerted editorial control over content
in a school-sponsored student newspaper. However, that action
must be reasonably related to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 105
Schools cannot censor student publications, theatrical productions,
and other constitutionally protected speech if there is not an
educational purpose to the censorship. 106
So, as long as there is an educational purpose the message
that the audience is supposed to receive or learn in a particular way,
and as long as school resources are being employed, then there is a
venue for the school to exercise editorial control without abridging
students’ First Amendment rights.
VII. BLAU AND DRESS CODE
103
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Student clothing is another form of expression, but the
courts have upheld student dress codes. In 2001, the Fort Thomas
Public School District in Fort Thomas, Kentucky, approved a
student dress code. 107 Robert Blau claimed that the school dress
code squelched his daughter’s freedom of expression under the First
Amendment. 108
The district court granted summary judgment for the school
district, but it was the Sixth Circuit that considered the First
Amendment claim. 109 The appellate court held that schools have
clear legal authority to enforce student dress code, and ruled that the
First Amendment did not apply to student dress codes. 110 The court
reasoned that all students participated in the dress code and Blau
was not restricted from conveying a particular message of
expression. 111 The court also stated that the First Amendment does
not protect every piece of clothing that an adolescent may choose to
wear on any given day. 112 Instead, to gain the protections of the First
Amendment, a claimant must show that the “desired conduct (e.g.,
the desired clothing) can fairly be described as ‘imbued with
elements of communication,’… which ‘convey[s] a particularized
message’ that will ‘be understood by those who view[ ] it,’ Spence,
418 U.S. at 411, 94 S.Ct. 2727.” 113 Blau wanted to wear the
clothing of her choice—such as blue jeans—not clothing that
expressed a particular message. 114 The court did not feel this was a
strong enough case to invoke the protections of the First
Amendment. 115
The Sixth Circuit then took the analysis a step further and
applied the O’Brien test to determine if the district’s dress code was
overly broad. 116 The Supreme Court created that test in United
States v. O’Brien, a case against men who burned their draft cards
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to protest the Vietnam War. 117 The test helps courts decide if
expressive conduct or symbolic speech should receive First
Amendment protection. The court stated in applying the test,
[u]nder the traditional test for assessing restrictions
on expressive conduct, a regulation will be upheld if
(1) it is unrelated to the suppression of expression,
(2) it “furthers an important or substantial
government interest,” O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, and
(3) it “does not burden substantially more speech
than necessary to further [the] interest [ ].” Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189, 117
S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997). The Blaus
cannot satisfy this test, much less show that the dress
code suppresses a “substantial” amount of protected
conduct. 118
Blau demonstrated again that a school, as a limited or closed
forum, can restrict actions that otherwise would be protected in the
non-school public environment. However, when there is expressive
conduct, the Blau court highlights an important measure—it must
be able to be perceived by others and understood as articulated as
set out in Spence. 119
It is worth noting that Blau is not a Supreme Court case and
does not apply in all jurisdictions. If another circuit reaches an
alternative decision and does deem dress to be protected, then attire
and hair could only be restricted if they are: materially and
substantially disruptive; 120 pervasively vulgar; 121 or prompt illegal
drug use. 122
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VIII. THE FRAMEWORK IN ACTION FOR LGBTQ IDENTITY IN
EDUCATION
The aforementioned Supreme Court cases of Tinker,
Hazelwood, Morse, and Bethel paired with the First Amendment
cases of Spence and O’Brien provide a foundation for current
LGBTQ cases that may arise. The starting point is generally with
the actions of the student. The first part of the analysis is to
determine if the issue is a student’s symbolic action, or if there are
actual written or spoken words. Next, was the speech vulgar or
profane, or did it promote illegal activities? Third, how has the
school responded to the student? Has the school district attempted
to limit the student’s action because it is viewed as a substantial
disruption, or is there a substantial governmental interest in
limiting that student’s speech? Finally, was the speech part of a
school-sponsored expressive activity, such as a student
newspaper? As of the time of this writing, no Supreme Court case
has dealt with K-12 LGBTQ student expression and speech that
has provided a decisive set of tests or rules to apply. What follows
are lower court decisions that apply these previous fundamental
cases to issues raised by LGBTQ students. Additionally, the Blau
case, in conjunction with the cases presented below, will provide
more elements to incorporate into the overall framework presented
in this paper, but may not be how the Supreme Court will rule
when they eventually take a case on this narrow combination of K12 schools and LGBTQ rights.
IX. FRICKE AND FREEDOM TO DANCE
The 1980 case of Fricke v. Lynche 123 addressed
whether a high school student could take a date of the same sex to a
school dance. Aaron Fricke, a senior at Cumberland High School in
Rhode Island, wanted to ask another male student to prom. 124 The
prom took place at a local country club and students were required
to bring an escort and name that person at the time they bought the

123
124

Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
Id. at 382–83.

84

tickets. 125 The escort need not be a senior nor a student of the
Cumberland district.
One year earlier, a Cumberland junior named Paul Guilbert
asked to bring a male escort to prom and was denied because the
principal l “fear[ed] that student reaction could lead to a disruption
at the dance and possibly to physical harm to Guilbert.” 126 When
students learned about the request, they taunted Guilbert, slapped
him, and spit at him. 127
The next year, Fricke sought to bring Guilbert as his date to
prom. 128 Fricke had never attended school dances, never dated girls,
and considered himself “exclusively homosexual and could not
conscientiously date girls.” 129 As with Guilbert, the principal denied
Fricke’s request in writing and stated that “his prime concern was
the fear that a disruption would occur and Aaron or, especially, Paul
would be hurt.” 130
Fricke filed suit alleging the school violated his First
Amendment right of association and free speech as well as his
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. 131 The court
began with the free speech analysis. 132 “[A] First Amendment free
speech claim must be, of course, to determine whether the action he
proposes to take has a ‘communicative content sufficient to bring it
within the ambit of the First Amendment.’” 133 The court said that
attendance at the dance is expressive content in and of itself and
there is an “exchange of ideas [that] takes place at informal social
functions” such as these. 134 Fricke testified that his attendance
“would have a certain political element and would be a statement
for equal rights and human rights.” 135
Following the Sixth Circuit’s lead, the court applied the
O’Brien Test to determine if Fricke’s communicative intent was
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transformed into protected speech. 136 This case describes the
elements of the test slightly differently, listing them as follows:
(1) was the regulation within the constitutional
power of the government; (2) did it further an
important or substantial governmental interest; (3)
was the governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and (4) was the
incidental restriction on alleged first amendment
freedoms no greater than essential to the furtherance
of that interest? 137
The court quickly dispensed of elements one and two,
stating that, “the school unquestionably has an important interest in
student safety and has the power to regulate students’ conduct to
ensure safety,” but said the school failed the fourth element because
the court did not feel the school made any effort to increase security
or take other precautions before outright denying Fricke the ability
to attend. 138
The third element, and the one connected to previous case
law, is whether the governmental interest was unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. 139 The principal testified that the
reason for Fricke’s suppression had nothing to do with the message
that would be conveyed or even his own feelings on homosexuality,
but rather his primary concern was for the safety of the students. 140
However, the court stated, “[t]hus the government’s interest here is
not in squelching a particular message because it objects to its
content as such. On the other hand, the school’s interest is in
suppressing certain speech activity because of the reaction its
message may engender. Surely this is still suppression of free
expression.” 141 The court then raised the issue common to these
cases – that one of the parties to the action was either a school or a
school principal. 142
136

Id.
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 386.
137

86

The court’s analysis followed traditional First Amendment
lines before it addressed the implications of the school setting. 143
The court acknowledged that under Tinker, “there are limits on first
amendment rights within the school.” 144
But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which
for any reason whether it stems from time, place or
type of behavior materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. 145
This returns to the substantial disruption test with the court
analogizing this case to Tinker, where the school administrators
acted out of fear of a distruption rather than in response to an actual
disturbance. 146
Newspapers in Boston and Rhode Island reported that after
Fricke filed the suit, another student assaulted him in an unprovoked
attack. 147 The school responded by providing Fricke with a parking
space closer to the doors and an escort to walk with him between
classes. 148 However, the court determined that this did not rise to a
level of disruption great enough to restrict Fricke’s constitutional
rights, and that “an actual hostile reaction is rarely an adequate basis
for curtailing free speech.” 149 The court ultimately held that “even
a legitimate interest in school discipline does not outweigh student’s
right to peacefully express his views in appropriate time, place, and
manner.” 150 Returning to the tyranny of Tinker, the threshold for
disturbance is much higher than most educators realize when they
attempt to balance school policies and First Amendment rights.
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X. MCMILLEN AND THE SECOND DANCE
In 2010, a similar case involving a prom was brought in
Fulton, Mississippi. In McMillen v. Itawamba County School
District, 151 Constance McMillen sued her school district when the
school denied her request to take her girlfriend to the prom. 152
McMillen was told that she and her girlfriend could attend the dance
separately but not as a couple, and that they would not be allowed
to slow dance together. 153 McMillen testified that the school
superintendent told her that she and her girlfriend would be “kicked
out” of the prom if they made anyone “uncomfortable.” 154 The
ACLU sent a letter on her behalf asking the school to change the
policies preventing her from attending the prom with a same-sex
date. 155 In response, the school district cancelled the entire prom and
asked that parents hold a private event for juniors and seniors. 156
The court considered a number of factors in its decision,
including the fact that McMillen did not want to hide her sexual
orientation and that it was part of who she was. The court also stated
that if McMillen went with a male date, she would be living a lie.
Finally, McMillen wanted to wear a tuxedo to prom as part of her
expression, and the court found it important that McMillen felt
strongly that students should not be forced to wear clothing that
conformed to traditional gender norms. 157
The court seemed sympathetic to McMillen’s cause. The
court began by referencing Bonner stating, “vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools.” 158 The court continued on to say
that, “[t]he Fifth Circuit has established that the ‘expression of one’s
identity and affiliation to unique social groups’ may constitute
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‘speech’ as envisioned by the First Amendment” 159 and that “the
United States Supreme Court has also held that states and their
agencies, such as the defendant, cannot set-out homosexuals for
special treatment, neither inclusive or [sic] exclusive.” 160 The court
acknowledged the factual similarities to Fricke, where it was two
male students who wanted to attend a dance in another circuit.
Further, referencing Fricke, the court found that a male student
taking a same sex date to prom has expressive content and thus was
within the ambit of the First Amendment. 161 The court concluded
that the school district “violated [McMillen’s] First Amendment
right by denying [her] request to bring her girlfriend as her date to
the prom.” 162
The court also addressed the issue of dressing in nongender-conforming attire as a form of freedom of expression. 163
Citing two other cases, the court noted that “clothing may also
symbolize ethnic heritage, religious beliefs, and political and social
views,” 164 and that “the choice to wear clothing as a symbol of an
opinion or cause is undoubtedly protected under the first
amendment if the message is likely to be understood by those
intended to view it.” 165 As in Blau 166, the court looked to the
communicative aspects of conduct based on two components: (1)
whether [a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present,” and (2) whether “the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.” 167 The court also
considered the decision in Tinker and if there would be a substantial
disruption from allowing McMillen to go to the dance as she
wished. 168 Instead, the court concluded that allowing McMillen to
159
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wear a tuxedo as a silent “expression and communication of her
viewpoint is the type of speech that falls squarely within the
purview of the First Amendment.” 169 Thus, the school board
violated McMillen's rights.
Nevertheless, the court denied the request for injunctive
relief because the public school prom had been cancelled. 170 A
private prom was slated to replace it and McMillen was invited to
attend that event. 171 The mere fact that the school board did an endrun around the issue by cancelling the event precluded an injunction
because the issue had become moot. 172 However, had the prom not
been cancelled, the court’s analysis is clear that McMillen’s rights
had been violated and an injunction would have been granted.
XI. DOE AND THE EXPRESSION OF GENDER IDENTITY
The last case is a 2000 decision from the Superior Court of
Massachusetts. 173 In Doe v. Yunits, the plaintiff was excluded from
South Junior High School over an expression of her gender identity
and sought to return to school. 174 The suit was brought on the “basis
of the plaintiff’s sex, disability, or gender identity and
expression.” 175 The plaintiff had been diagnosed with a gender
identity disorder, “which means that, although plaintiff was born
biologically male, she has a female gender identity” 176 and sought
to be allowed to wear the clothing and accessories conforming to
her gender identity. 177
In 1999, the school principal sent the plaintiff home to
change on multiple occasions when she arrived at school wearing
girls’ clothing. 178 The school cited incidents between the plaintiff
and male students such as blowing kisses and male students. On
169
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September 1, 2000, school personel informed her that she would not
be allowed to attend South Junior High if she were to wear any
outfits “disruptive to the educational process”, specifically padded
bras, skirts or dresses, or wigs. 179 The school contended it had “not
barred the plaintiff from school but have merely provided limits on
the type of dress the plaintiff may wear.” 180
In analyzing the First Amendment issues in Doe, the court
articulated a multi-part test. First, the court must determine whether
the First Amendment protects the symbolic acts as expressive
speech. 181 As stated in the Spence test, this includes determining if
the plaintiff’s intent is to convey a particularized message and the
likelihood of that message being understood by those who perceive
it. 182 Second, if the plaintiff’s speech is expressive, the court must
determine if the the goal of the regulation is to suppress that
speech. 183Third, if the regulation is not about the message but
something else that the government can regulate, then the court
should apply the O’Brien test, which is essentially intermediate
scrutiny. For the school to prevail, their conduct has to further “an
important or substantial government interest, and [be] within the
constitutional powers of the government, and . . . the incidental
restriction on speech [must be] no greater than necessary.” 184
Finally, because the First Amendment rights of publicschool students were at issue, the Doe court applied Tinker. The
court stated that “because this case involves public school students,
suppression of speech that ‘materially and substantially interferes
with the work of the school’ is permissible.” 185
In this case, the court concluded that the plaintiff intended
to send a message, and by virtue of the hostility it received from the
faculty and student body, that message was received. 186 Second, the
court concluded that the school did intend to suppress the speech
itself and, therefore, there was no reason to apply O’Brien because
179
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there was not a substantial government interest in regulating the
plaintiff’s speech. 187
Finally, relying on Tinker, the school district argued that the
plaintiff’s dress and actions were disruptive. 188 The court divided
the issue of expression represented by the plaintiff’s clothing choice
and the issue of substantial disruption as did Tinker. The court held
that the student’s manner of dress, as a form of expression, was
separate from her disruptive conduct toward other students, which
might have been unrelated to her expression. 189 The school district
contended that it would discipline other students who dressed in this
manner and was not singling the plaintiff out. 190 However, the court
disagreed because the school district’s argument turned on the
gender orientation of the student’s clothing selection. 191
Considering that a student born female and wearing the same thing
as the plaintiff would go unnoticed, the plaintiff’s clothes should not
have been a distraction either. 192 Thus, the school district’s
argument failed the substantial-disruption test. 193 The court
summed up its holding, stating,
It seems, however, that expression of gender identity
through dress can be divorced from conduct in
school that warrants punishment, regardless of the
gender or gender identity of the offender. Therefore,
a school should not be allowed to bar or discipline a
student because of gender-identified dress but
should be permitted to ban clothing that would be
inappropriate if worn by any student, such as
theatrical costume, and to punish conduct that would
be deemed offensive if committed by any student,
such as harassing, threatening, or obscene
behavior. 194
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XII. FREE SPEECH FRAMEWORK AND PROTECTIONS FOR LGBTQ
STUDENTS
Lawyers not only must engage in a fair amount of theorybuilding in cases, but also must do so from what can otherwise be
a vague court case when a rule is not clearly spelled out. This
article is an effort to provide a case analysis of foundational First
Amendment education cases to build a structure for advancing
LGBTQ cases and provide legal practitioners with an evolutionary
legal history and key citations for their legal arguments and briefs.
Based on the above key cases, there are several concepts that can
be synthesized into a theory of protected speech under the First
Amendment that is unique to LGBTQ students. This theory
outlines the steps that a court should conduct in its analysis.
First, the court must determine what kind of speech was
conveyed. If it is expressive conduct, we begin with Spence and
O'Brien, whereas if it is pure speech, we begin with Bethel and
Morse.
For an expressive conduct analysis, Spence v. Washington
(and as applied in Texas v. Johnson) has two components: (1) “[a]n
intent to convey a particularized message was present,” and (2) that
“the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it.” 195
As Fricke and Hazelwood demonstrate, a First Amendment
case should continue its analysis with the O’Brien test, and the
issues that surround education will most likely revolve around the
third prong of the test—was the governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of free expression? A court will also consider what
actions the school took that curtailed the speech and whether the
school claimed a substantial government interest in regulating the
plaintiff’s speech.
Once the analysis moves through these traditional First
Amendment tests, the trier of fact must look at the special legal
characteristics of a school. A court must look at the form of
expression and separate it from any conduct of the student under
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Tinker. 196 The court may then look to apply the substantialdisruption test. When determining if a substantial disruption has
occurred, there must be more than fear of outbursts from students
that result from a difference of view or opinion. There is a much
higher bar for conduct to constitute substantial disruption to curtail
First Amendment rights than most educators have been trained to
realize.
Most educators only think of a disruption within the scope
of their educational training, which could be anything from talking
in class and passing notes to violence. Most educators have not been
trained on the legal framework of these issues. Schools can limit the
delivery of speech to socially appropriate words (but the courts have
given substantial deference to the schools to determine this
appropriateness – leaving it intentionally vague), but it generally
cannot limit the conveyance of controversial ideas. 197 “[I]n light of
the special characteristics of the school environment,” creating a
limited forum for minors that has “bumper lanes” for expression to
curb certain speech that would be protected for adults in public is
necessary. 198
Finally, we must divide the educational environment further.
The Hazelwood Court concluded that because a school can be seen
as a closed forum, it can also divide student speech and expression
into further categories. 199 While a school cannot limit individual
student speech unless it is disruptive, it can limit student speech that
uses the school’s educational resources to reach an audience (1)
where it looks like the school endorsed or supported the message;
and (2) where the audience is supposed to learn a specific concept,
the school can control that educational message. 200
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XIII. CONCLUSION
Through careful analysis of key First Amendment cases, a
framework can be created that outlines protected forms of LGBTQ
expression and gender identity in schools. The main elements to
consider when analyzing LGBTQ First Amendment rights in the
educational environment include: (1) Under Spence, do the
symbolic acts constitute expressive speech that is protected, such as
political speech? (2) Under O’Brien, did the school district intend
to suppress the speech because of the speech’s content? (3) Also
under O’Brien, does the school district’s limiting action further a
substantial governmental interest? (4) Under Tinker’s substantialdisruption test, did the action of the student interfere with the
educational environment or is it a silent expression? (5) Under
Bethel, was the student’s speech vulgar or profane? (6) Under
Morse, did the speech promote illegal activities? (7) And under
Hazelwood, was the speech part of a school-sponsored expressive
activity, such as a student newspaper?
All seven of these elements play a key role in the analysis of
First Amendment cases for LGBTQ students, but not all seven
elements play a role every time or have the same amount of weight
depending on the circumstances. For example, we must first
determine if the speech is pure speech or symbolic expression (e.g.,
a public speech, which is active, versus an armband, which is
passive). Then as we turn to the suppression of speech, we must
consider if the speech was suppressed because of its content,
because of its time, place, and manner, or because it was disruptive
to the educational environment. We must consider the venue and the
activity. The school not only has a responsibility for the curriculum
of what is taught, but also students authored work that looks like it
was underwritten by the school. In those cases where the school is
largely responsible for the expression, promotion, or dissemination
of ideas, the school has more latitude in controlling the message.
Finally, anything illegal or otherwise considered vulgar or profane
by general societal and civil discourse standards will probably not
cut in the student’s favor in showing a violation of the First
Amendment.
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